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Once entirely the domain of space-borne applications, the effects of high energy charged particles on 
electronics systems is now also a concern for terrestrial devices. Reconfigurable components such as 
FPGAs are particularly vulnerable to radiation single event effects (SEU) as they carry a large amount of 
memory within a relatively small amount of circuit area. This thesis presents a Silicon on Insulator (SOI) 
based configuration memory system in a radiation hard reconfiguration system. The SOI technology used 
in this particular work is Silicon on Sapphire, where Sapphire is used as the body insulator. A non-volatile 
storage cell, able to be manufactured in a standard single polysilicon SOI CMOS process with no special 
layers, is combined with a Schmitt amplifier which result a final structure that exhibits two unique 
characteristics enhancing its resistance to radiation. Firstly, it is impossible for a radiation induced event 
to permanently flip the configuration state. Secondly, a partial de-programming resulting in a reduction in 
the magnitude of the storage cell voltage causes a large change in static current that can be very easily 
detected using a conventional sense amplifier. A simple current detector of the type used in conventional 
RAM circuits allows the configuration memory to be set up to exhibit self-correcting, or “auto-scrubbing” 
behavior. While the combination of SOI EEPROM and Schmitt exhibits high intrinsic resistance to 
radiation induced errors, it is still possible for a sequence of two particle strikes to cause the configuration 
value to be lost. Estimates are made of the Soft error Rate (SER) performance of the overall configuration 
memory structure. A trial layout of a configurable Look Up Table (LUT) is presented as an example of 
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BLE Basic Logic Element 
CMOS  Complementary metal–oxide–semiconductor 
DWC Duplication with Comparison 
ECC Error Correction Code 
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FIT  Failure in Time 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Electronic circuits function by defining small packets of charge as elemental bits of data. Circuits 
transform these small charge packets to achieve the required output. When any unwanted charge makes a 
change to either the stored information or the desired output, it is considered to be an error or noise. 
Errors of this kind affecting the data stored or the momentary information at any level of circuits are 
described as soft errors. These Single Event Effect triggered soft errors have been called the “Achilles’ 
heel” of reliability in modern electronics [1]. Unwanted charge resulting in these kinds of errors can be 
created within semiconductor devices by the dense ionization tracks of electron-hole pairs generated by 
radiation such as cosmic rays or high energy particles. These can cause hard failure as well as soft 
failures. The scope of this thesis is soft failure and will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
The radiation sensitivity of semiconductors was first revealed in the early 1960s [2, 3].  Before this 
phenomenon was identified by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the newly invented MOS 
transistors were expected to be far more tolerant to radiation compared to existing bipolar transistors [4]. 
This was also the reason why MOS devices were expected to be ideal for space applications. However, 
satellite electronics started to show unreliability from 1962 to 1970  [2, 5] and significant redundancy had 
to be built into the circuits to harden them against this problem. Soft errors in space applications were first 
reported in 1975 in [6] . The definition of soft error for memories was presented by May and Woods in 
their well-referenced IPRS paper presented in 1978 [7]. The term “soft error” was defined as random, 
non-recurring, single-bit errors in memory elements, not caused by electrical noise or electromagnetic 
interference but by radiation. The authors reported on soft errors in the Intel 2170-series 16-kb DRAMs, 
which were caused by alpha particles emitted in the radioactive decay of uranium and thorium impurities 
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in the packaging material. That paper was also responsible for first highlighting the issue of radiation 
induced errors in electronics at sea level. It was mentioned that electron-hole pairs are generated when 
alpha particles interact with the silicon surface of the chip. The resulting charge can be collected by the 
depletion layer and the electrons thus generated may end up in the storage wells of the memory elements. 
If the amount of the collected charge exceeds a critical threshold charge, called QCRIT, a soft error occurs. 
Soft errors have become a more severe issue over time as integrated circuit technology has advanced. In 
space, the source of radiation affecting the electronics include charged particles trapped by the magnetic 
field of the earth, high energy particles from galactic cosmic radiation as well as charged and energetic 
charged particles created in Solar Particle Event (SPE) occurrences. Although once thought to be a 
problem only in space-borne applications, radiation induced circuit failure is increasingly a problem for 
terrestrial applications. Any electrical circuit used in the nuclear mine or power plant or the medical 
instruments using radiation would have to maintain proper functionality within their respective radiation 
environment. Radiation has therefore become an ongoing issue for electronic circuits to deal with. A well-
known example occurred in 1999/2000 in the high end enterprise server line of Sun Microsystems [8], 
which ranged in cost from $50,000 to more than $1 million. Some customers reported that their server 
equipment crashed occasionally for no apparent reason. Sun had to put months of effort to find out that 
soft errors in the cache memory was the root cause. A famous one-liner for the industry was uttered by one 
of their customers at that time “It’s ridiculous. I’ve got a $300,000 server that doesn’t work. This thing 
should be bulletproof!”[8]. This also indicates the severity of the memory failure issue of soft errors from 
both a commercial and a technical viewpoint. The company had to spend several millions of dollars and 
many man-hours dealing with the issue and, even so, their reputation was severely affected. 
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Soft errors created by particle strikes are normally quantified in terms of either Soft Error Rate (SER) or 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). The SER is the rate at which soft errors appears in a device for a 
given environment. When the particular environment is known then SER can be given in Failures in Time 
(FIT). In semiconductor memory FIT is often given in FIT/Mb or in FIT/device, where one FIT represents 
one device failure in 109 hours. MTBF gives the value of time between any two consecutive errors and is 
normally expressed in years. One year MTBF is equal to approximately 114,077 FIT. 
Reconfigurable systems such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have become increasingly 
interesting and attractive for designers. Their flexibility has allowed designers to test circuits prior to 
manufacture as well as to deploy them in production systems. Reconfigurable components like FPGAs 
are particularly sensitive to Single Event Upset (SEU) induced soft errors. As the circuit is defined in the 
array via its configuration memory, any error in this memory may change the design logic or even induce 
internal short circuits. The result may be, at best, a change in the function of the circuit and, at worse, its 
destruction.  
Various techniques have been developed to harden CMOS (Complementary Metal–Oxide–
Semiconductor) logic against SEU, both for the underlying hardware [9] and at the design stage. 
Extensive work has been done to improve the reliability of the existing FPGAs. While mitigation 
techniques such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), scrubbing and other circuit design techniques 
have been used to make a system more radiation tolerant, it is often difficult to justify the cost in terms of 
area and power compared to the level of extra robustness achieved by the techniques. These techniques, 
along with their advantages and drawbacks, are discussed further in Chapter 2. 
As just mentioned, radiation such as energetic particles or cosmic rays create electron-hole pairs in the 
silicon in bulk CMOS. For this reason, Silicon on Insulator (SOI) technology is a better choice for 
radiation hard circuits. The silicon substrate in this technology is separated by an insulating material from 
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the silicon within which the active devices are created. Silicon on Sapphire (SOS) is a subclass of SOI 
technology where the insulating material used is sapphire (Al2O3). As the region between active devices is 
etched away in this technology, and the devices sit on an insulating layer of sapphire, complete electrical 
isolation is created between active devices, as well as between the devices and the silicon substrate. As 
the sensitive regions around the channel are insulated from the substrate, the funnelling effect, that adds to 
the charge collection  in bulk silicon, can be neglected in SOS [10]. The only charge collection is in the 
silicon as no charge can get collected in the sapphire, thus the overall charge collection volume is smaller 
than that in bulk CMOS processes. Finally, its inherent resistance to radiation, high input impedance 
characteristics, high noise immunity and relative insensitivity to voltage variation makes CMOS/SOS a 
good solution for high radiation environments [11] .  
1.2 Motivation and Scope 
The main objective of this research is to propose and analyse a method of building a radiation hardened 
Field-programmable gate array organization based on Silicon-On-Sapphire technology. To achieve this, 
the work has focussed on a number of basic questions: 
1. How does radiation resistant circuit design differ from conventional design? 
2. What modifications can be made to reconfigurable circuits to improve their radiation resistance 
characteristics? 
3. How can SOS technology be used to develop reconfigurable systems and what circuit techniques 
will be most applicable? 
4. What are the area characteristics of such a reconfigurable system constructed using SOS 
technology? 
The work described in this thesis has focussed specifically on the design and analysis of a novel 
configuration memory system intended for use in a field programmable organisation that can be built 
using commercial Silicon on Sapphire. One example of this process is UltraCMOS™, originally 
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developed by Peregrine Semiconductor [10] and offered under licence by Silanna Semiconductor [11] and 
this has formed the basis of the simulations performed for this thesis. 
1.3 Approach and Methodology 
While bulk CMOS has been the dominant technology for many years, its continued scaling is predicted to 
become increasingly difficult [12]. Silicon-on-insulator (SOI, which includes SOS) promises to ease 
many of the long-term scaling problems of CMOS. Although charge trapping at the boundary of the 
buried oxide and the channel is still an issue, SOI devices have already been shown to exhibit a 
significantly better dose rate radiation response than bulk CMOS, as well as a higher resistance to single-
event upset (SEU) events [13].  
Further, because it lacks the parasitic PN junctions between the source/drain regions and the substrate, 
SOI supports some circuit techniques that are simply not possible in bulk CMOS. One such technique, an 
unconventional EEPROM cell patented by Peregrine [14] has already been applied to several of their 
products. This cell comprises a pair of cross-coupled nMOS and pMOS transistor sharing a common 
floating gate which can be charged positive or negative with respect to ground via the injection of either 
holes or electrons through the gate oxide. Unlike more traditional floating gate EEPROM cells, the SOS 
cell requires no special process layers and is therefore relatively easy to fabricate and to integrate with 
other logic and interface blocks. 
This thesis proposes and simulates a configuration memory system that is based on the SOS EEPROM 
cell and that offers two useful characteristics. Firstly, each cell has a built-in Schmitt sense amplifier so 
that, while a particle strike on the interface may result in a transient upset, there is no mechanism by 
which the logic value of the configuration memory cell can be permanently flipped. An event that 
significantly disturbs the charge on the floating gate will move the cell voltage towards zero but can never 
reach the switching threshold of the Schmitt. The worse-case effect will be a significant increase in the 
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static current drawn by the sense amplifier, in some cases over five orders of magnitude, as its input bias 
changes. This behaviour underpins the second advantage of the proposed configuration memory: the 
ability to sense an upset and thereby to trigger a scrubbing event using a simple current sense mechanism. 
In common with existing scrubbing mechanisms, rewriting a configuration cell will have no effect on the 
cell logic. Correcting a cell charge simply returns the static current to its pre-upset value. 
All of the components described in Chapter 3 and 4 have been designed and simulated using models for 
commercially available 250nm SOS process [15], for which a process design kit (PDK) was readily 
available. However, it is considered extremely likely that the techniques presented will translate directly 
to other SOI processes, for example the 45nm SOI process that has recently become available through the 
MOSIS fabrication service [16]. 
This research has resulted in the following specific outcomes: 
• A detailed analysis of the impact on circuit design of ionising radiation and a description of 
radiation hard digital logic circuits compared to existing circuit design; 
• A detailed analysis of a novel configuration memory based on a commercial SOS EEPROM 
device that offers improved radiation resistance;  
• The design and layout of a FPGA organization based on the SOS EEPROM; 
• An analysis of the operating characteristics of the SOS configuration system. 
 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 presents the background to this work and previous research in the area, including various 
sources of radiation and their effects on electronic systems. It then discusses the mitigation techniques 
that have been used or are currently in use to harden a digital design against radiation, along with their 
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advantages and disadvantages. Following this, the Chapter focuses on the Silicon on insulator (SOI) 
technology showing why it is a suitable choice for radiation hard designs. The unique SOS EEPROM 
(silicon on Sapphire Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only memory) cell on which this work is 
based (also known as PlusCell®, due to its layout) is then described. Finally, the modelling of the induced 
current due to a particle strike in terms of a double exponential current pulse is discussed.  
Chapter 3 presents the circuits developed for this thesis. It shows the reconfigurable memory based on the 
SOS EEPROM cell, and how it can be set up to exhibit auto-scrubbing behaviour by the addition of a 
Schmitt trigger sense amplifier to each cell. 
Chapter 4 describes the circuits, simulations and results that support the work of this thesis. It presents the 
circuits for this work drawn in the Cadence® design environment and the conclusions derived from these 
simulation results. 
Chapter 5 concludes the work and identifies future work. 
1.5 Publications 
The following publications have arisen directly from the work described in this thesis: 
Haque, K., Beckett, P., "A SOI EEPROM Based Configuration Cell with Simple Scrubbing Detection," 
24th International Conference on VLSI Design (VLSI Design), 2011, pp.24-29, 2-7 Jan. 2011, doi: 
10.1109/VLSID.2011.50. 
Kashfia Haque and Paul Beckett, “A Radiation Hard LUT Block with Auto-Scrubbing”, accepted for oral 
presentation, 21st International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, FPL 2011, 
September 5-7, Chania, Crete, Greece. 
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Kashfia Haque, Paul Beckett, "A Radiation Hard Configuration Memory with Auto-Scrubbing", accepted 
for oral presentation, 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, 7-10 November 
2011, Melbourne, Australia. 
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Chapter 2 Radiation, Soft errors, and Mitigation Techniques 
2.1 Introduction 
Once entirely the domain of space-borne applications, the effects of high energy charged particles on 
electronic systems are becoming increasingly important even in terrestrial situations. This chapter begins 
by examining the radiation environment and its various sources. Then its significance to electronic 
circuits is highlighted by expanding on the error and damage caused by radiation. The functionality of the 
FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) is then discussed with particular reference as to why FPGAs, 
and specially their configuration memory blocks, are vulnerable to radiation. The mitigation techniques 
used to tackle soft errors in FPGA devices and memory cells are then reviewed, identifying their 
advantages and disadvantages. At this point SOI (Silicon on Insulator) technology is introduced to show 
why it is a good choice for space-borne applications. 
2.2 Radiation Environments 
Modern electronics are now expected to survive in harsh, high radiation environments. The main battle-
ground between electronics and radiation takes place in space. However, electronics in diverse 
applications such as nuclear mines, power stations or reactors through to life-saving medical 
instrumentation will also have to survive to ensure safe and reliable operation. There is also increasing 
concern for the effects of radiation in conventional electronics at sea level [17]. 
In general, the space radiation environment [18] consists of many different kinds of energetic particles 
[19]. The energy of these particles ranges from kev to Gev and possibly beyond. Particles that present a 
danger are either trapped by the magnetic field of the Earth or are just passing through the solar system 
[20]. The three main sources [21] of ionization radiation (energetic particles) in space are: 
1. Trapped radiation; 
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2. Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR); 
3. Solar Particles Events (SPE). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Trapped Radiation Belts Around Earth (adapted from [21]) 
2.2.1 Trapped Radiation 
A Magnetic field exists around the Earth as a result of an electric current produced by the rotation of the 
Earth’s molten iron core [20]. A stream of particles (called the solar winds) is produced by the sun and 
travels at about one million miles per hour. Charged particles created by the solar wind are shielded by 
the Earth’s magnetic field and a shock front is formed around which the particles are deflected as the 
particles and the magnetic field interact [22]. The magnetic field is compressed and confined by the solar 
wind on the side facing the sun that stretches out into a long tail on the other (night) side. The cavity 
formed by this process is called the magnetosphere and this protects the surface of Earth from the 
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constant bombardment of charged particles. Nevertheless, some charged particles become trapped in the 
earth’s magnetic field rather than being deflected. These particles are trapped in the doughnut shaped 
magnetic field surrounding the Earth called the Van Allen radiation belt. This belt has two segments: the 
region up to 2.4RE (RE = Earth’s radius) is called the inner zone and the approximate region between 
2.8RE and 12 RE the outer zone [21]. The space between them is known as the “slot”. The inner zone 
contains mainly protons with energies exceeding 10MeV whereas the outer zone contains mainly 
electrons with energies up to 10 MeV. The charged particles in the belt circulate along the Earth’s 
magnetic lines of force that extend from the area above the equator to the North Pole, to the South Pole 
then circle back to the equator [21]. 
The magnetic axis of Earth is tilted approximately 11 degrees from the spin axis and the centre of the 
magnetic field is 280 miles offset from the geographical centre of the Earth [21]. This fact causes a dip in 
the Van Allen belt down to about 200 km into the upper region of the atmosphere over the southern 
Atlantic Ocean. This region is known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA, see Figure 2.1) [23]. The 
protons in the SAA provide the most intense radiation source in low earth orbit (LEO). 
2.2.2 Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR) 
Galactic cosmic radiation originates outside the solar system and is made up of about 85% protons, 14% 
alpha particles and 1% nuclides with Z > 2, (where Z is the atomic number of an element). However 
heavy ions with Z > 26 are rare [22]. The particles in this region have energies varying from 0 to over 10 
GeV [21]. Although the flux level of these particles is very low, as they travel at very close to the speed 
of light, they produce intense ionization as they pass through matter. This is also a reason why they are 
difficult to shield against compared to the trapped energetic particles even though the trapped particles 
have higher energy. The Earth’s magnetic field offers shielding for spacecraft from galactic cosmic 
radiation for the most part. However, cosmic rays and solar particles can reach low altitudes and 
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inclinations in polar regions where the field lines open to interplanetary space [22] as well as during large 
solar events or magnetic storms when the magnetic field lines are compressed. Studies have shown that 
the number of galactic particle increases at solar minima and the solar particle level increases at solar 
maxima [23]. 
2.2.3 Solar Particles Events (SPE) 
The injection of energetic electrons, protons, alpha particles and heavier particles into the planetary space 
is known as solar particle events [18]. Their presence temporarily enhances the radiation in the 
interplanetary space around the magnetosphere and they may also travel to lower altitudes at polar 
regions, as just mentioned. The solar flare intensity varies with time with the highest dose occurring every 
10-12 years with approximately 50 -100 large flares occurring per 10-12 year interval [24]. The solar flare 
contains about 90% alpha particles with energies ranging from 10 MeV to 1GeV while the remaining 
10% includes heavy ions and electrons [21, 23]. However, shielding is only effective on the protons with 
lower energy, not on higher energy particles. 
Radiation is also expected in nuclear reactor environments like nuclear fusion power plants and in 
radiation processing environments. Radiation processing includes using radiation for beneficial purposes, 
for example waste recycling and disposal, water recycling and the sterilization of medical equipment. 
Medical environments such as high LET radiation therapy [25, 26] would also have to cope with radiation 
effects. 
2.3 Radiation effects on Semiconductors 
Radiation has been a major concern for the space and aviation electronics for almost half a century now 
[27], [28]. Trapped protons and electrons, high energy particles, cosmic radiation and solar flares all have 
their effects on electronic devices [18, 19, 28]. Just as it has already established its significance in space, 
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it is also showing its presence at lower altitudes [29-31] and is also becoming a concern at sea level [5]. 
With the reduction in feature size and operating voltages accompanying developments in IC technology, 
the effect has become more severe [19]. Both the physical structure of electronic devices, as well as their 
functionality have become more vulnerable to radiation. These radiation effects [1, 24, 32] are mainly 
categorised into: 
1. Total Ionisation Dose (TID); 
2. Single Event Effect (SEE). 
2.3.1 Total Ionisation Effect 
Total ionization effect is a cumulative effect on transistors due to long term exposure to protons and 
neutrons [3], [33]. Total Ionisation Dose (TID) occurs when high energy electrons or protons pass through 
the device and produce electron-hole pairs [34], which then interact with the gate and field oxide of the 
MOS structure. Electrons resulting from ionization have high mobility in the oxide and are quickly swept 
out by the internal fields [32]. Holes, on the other hand, have much lower mobility and only a fraction of 
them will be transported to the silicon/silicon-dioxide interface, where they will be trapped. This changes 
the threshold voltage [35, 36] and the mobility of the gate and field oxide transistors, and therefore 
changes their characteristics. The more long-lasting of these effects can cause permanent or semi-
permanent damage in the device such as increased device leakage [37] and power consumption [38], 
timing changes [39] plus an overall decrease in functionality.  
 
As an example of the effects of TID, on July 8th, 1962 a nuclear test (code-named Starfish) detonated a 
1.4 Megaton nuclear weapon at an altitude of about 400 km above the Johnston Islands in the Pacific. On 
July 9th, 1962 the Telstar [40] satellite was launched and experienced the first failure due to TID [41]. The 
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Starfish explosion produced beta particles that were trapped within the Earth’s magnetic field, forming an 
artificial radiation belt that lasted until the 1970s and destroyed seven satellites within seven months. 
 
Figure 2.2: Cross section of an NMOS transistor with trapped  
positive charges in the gate oxide (adapted from[32]) 
 
Greatly simplified, the operation of an ideal NMOS transistor is to allow current to flow when sufficient 
voltage is applied to the gate and prevent current flowing when the voltage is below critical threshold 
[32]. The gate is isolated from the source and the drain by the gate oxide. When the device is exposed to 
radiation the oxide becomes ionized by the dose it absorbs and electrons and holes are produced. 
Electrons, being much more mobile than holes, move away while a small fraction of the holes become 
trapped in the gate oxide. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 2.2. (from [32]). After sufficient exposure 
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to TID a large positive charge builds up and the device acts as if there were a positive voltage applied to 
it, causing the device to remain on all the time even if no signal voltage is applied [18, 32, 42].  
The effect on the PMOS transistor is similar, but complementary. When PMOS is exposed to radiation, a 
trapped positive charge build up in the gate oxide and with enough exposure and sufficient positive 
charge in the gate oxide, the PMOS remains permanently off. Thus for a gate comprising both NMOS and 
PMOS transistors operating together in logical blocks, the output will be frozen at either 1 or 0 after a 
sufficient dose is accumulated [32]. 
Thin non-crystalline dielectrics films and dielectric film/silicon interfaces are especially susceptible to 
TID in MOS devices [3]. Charge builds up due to radiation in these thin film dielectric regions and 
interfaces, causing device degradation. The charge build up depends on the dose, dose rate, type of 
ionisation [35, 36], device geometry [43-45], operating temperature [46, 47], dielectric material properties 
[48, 49], fabrication procession, oxide impurities [50, 51] and final packaging [52]. 
While the threshold in PMOS and NMOS will shift due to charge accumulation by the Total Ionization 
Dose, this shift depends on the amount of charge accumulated and the thickness of the oxide [34]. The 
carrier mobility in the device will also be reduced due to the induced charge and thus the gain 
(transconductance) of the transistors will decrease [53-55]. Trapped charge that builds up in the lateral 
oxide isolation regions also serve to increase the leakage current [37, 56, 57] and cause a degradation in 
the junction break down voltage in N channels and enhancement in the P channels [38]. TID has been 
shown to increase the propagation delay in logic circuits [58, 59] and access times in memory [60]. 
Functional failure due to TID may also occur as the standby current increases due to trapped holes in the 
oxide [61].  
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2.3.2 Single Event Effect 
Single Event Effect (SEE) is not a cumulative effect and as suggested by the name results from single 
energetic particles. The idea of Single Event Upsets (SEU) was first introduced in 1962 by Wallmark and 
Marcus [62]. The first failure in a satellite due to SEE was reported in Binder et al. in 1975 [6]. The 
authors suggested that this was due to the triggering of flip flop circuits as a result of the charge created 
by the electron-hole pairs generated by cosmic ray particles with high atomic number and high energy. 
May and Woods [63] then introduced the definition of “soft errors” as random, nonrecurring, single bit 
errors in memory elements, not caused by electrical noise or electromagnetic interference but by 
radiation. However, their work focused on alpha particles resulting from the natural decay of the uranium 
and thorium present in integrated circuit packaging material rather than alpha particles from space. 
SEEs mostly affect digital devices. High-energy heavy particles, such as galactic cosmic rays, produce far 
more ionization in semiconductors than electrons or protons. A short duration of charge from an ion may 
be high enough to disturb the functionality of the circuit. A SEE occurs when a particle hitting a circuit 
fulfils two conditions. Firstly, it should have sufficient energy to deposit the minimum charge required to 
generate an event and secondly, the particle must hit within an area that is sensitive to the charge (e.g., the 
drain of an OFF transistor). 
This sensitive area represents the top face of a sensitive volume within which the energetic particle has an 
effect. The cross section of the sensitive area determines the probability of a SEE occurring. The energy 
that is transferred to the silicon when a particle successfully strikes any device within its sensitive area is 
called LET (Linear Energy Transferred) [8]. This represents a measure of the energy lost by the incoming 
particle along its path. For example, a particle having a LET of 97Mev cm2/mg will deposit about 
1pC/µm in silicon. The minimum LET just sufficient to cause a SEE is known as the threshold LET 
(LETTh). Thus, charge collected in the sensitive volume below LETth is (by definition) too small to induce 
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a SEE. The cross section is a function of LET and the saturation cross section defines the upper limit for 
SEE. The minimum charge that needs to be collected by a sensitive data node to cause an upset is known 
as Critical Charge. The charge associated with the LETth of any device is the critical charge for that 
device. An ion or particle with charge greater than critical charge will not increase the SEE probability. 
 
Figure 2.3: Single Event Effect hit response description (adapted from [32]) 
As mentioned, the triggering of an SEE and its specific effect are determined by the device type, 
technology, the localisation and amount of injected charge. SEE can be destructive or non-destructive. 
Non-destructive SEEs are Single Event Upset, Single Event Transient and Single Event Functional 
Interrupts. Destructive SEEs include Single Event Burnout, Single Event Latchup and Single Event Gate 
Rupture [64]. 
A Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state in a memory cell or register due to single ion/particle 
interaction with the storage device. Such soft errors occur when the node value or the device is disturbed 
sufficiently to change its switching value momentarily due to an external event such as a particle strike. 
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lasting compared to the information storage time and gate propagation delays causing an incorrect result 
to maintained for a relatively long period of time. This can be catastrophic as memory forms a significant 
portion of modern electronics in terms of its area as well as its functionality. With the amount of charge 
representing the stored information dropping at successive technology nodes, the sensitivity of CMOS 
devices to single particle charge collection is also increasing. SEUs are now the biggest contributor to soft 
errors in many modern CMOS technologies.  
The sensitive volume of MOS transistors is bounded by a depletion region within the reverse biased drain 
diffusion [65]. The charge from a particle strike is collected within the sensitive volume and creates a 
current across the P-N junction in the direction of the reverse saturation current. For example, Figure 2.3 
shows the track of the ionization charge (electron-hole pairs) that characterizes a single event. When a 
particle hit occurs at a reverse biased logic circuit node, a voltage transient occurs as the resultant excess 
minority carrier charge is collected at the node along the track.  If the charge collected is above the critical 
charge then there will be a bit flip in the node, potentially resulting a loss of information i.e., a soft error. 
The six transistor CMOS static RAM cell shown in Figure 2.4 is widely used as a memory cell. When a 
node is hit by an energetic particle, if the charge collected at the node is less than the critical charge then 
the event does not have any significant impact on the device and no error occurs. On the other hand, when 
the charge collected by the node exceeds the critical charge, the node switches, the value flips and an 
error occur in the data. The change in state of one element is the Single Bit Upset (SBU) [66]. When the 
change occurs in more than one element it is called a Multiple Bit Upset (MBU). Note that both SBU and 
MBU result from a single event. When multiple SEUs occur in the same device in relatively short amount 
of time it is referred as Multiple Independent Upsets (MIU)s[67].  
 




Figure 2.4: An example of SEU in a standard ST SRAM. (Adapted from [65]) 
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A Single Event Transient (SET) occurs when a dynamic memory element, e.g. flip flop or latch, 
transitions to an incorrect value due to the deposited charge. The charge collected from an ionization 
event discharges in the form of a “fake” signal travelling through the circuit. A SET will cause an actual 
error only when the resulting pulse coincides with the clock edge that transfers a new value. For example, 
a SET is effective in a flip flop only if the particle strike creating the pulse occurs at the clock edge that 
registers a new value. Therefore, the rate of SET faults depends on the clock frequency. The chance of a 
pulse coinciding with a clock edge increases at higher clock frequencies. 
Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI) are a special kind of SEU first categorised in 1996 [68]. SEFI 
occurs in the same way as SEU but has somewhat different effects. When an upset is responsible for some 
changes in the functionality of the device, i.e. when the function interrupted due to the unwanted current 
pulse it is considered as SEFI. For example, an FPGA may suffer SEFI in several ways [66]. For 
example, an SEU in the power on reset (POR) control circuitry will cause the entire FPGA to reset, 
including its configuration memory values. 
Single Event Burnout refers to the destructive failures of power MOSFET transistors in high power 
applications and may cause catastrophic failure as device malfunction and permanent damage to the 
circuit. 
Single Event Latch up occurs when a charge deposition triggers the parasitic bipolar transistors in the 
device causing a short circuit between the power supply and ground. SEL may be limited to a small 
region or may propagate to affect a large part of the chip. The large currents caused by this short circuit 
effect can permanently damage components if they are not externally protected against the large short 
circuit current and resulting power dissipation. 
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Soft errors are typically measured in terms of either Soft Error Rate (SER) or Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF). The SER is the rate at which soft errors occurs in a device for a given environment. 
When the particular environment is known then SER can be given in Failure in Time (FIT). In 
semiconductor memory FIT is often given in FIT/Mb or in FIT/device, where one FIT represents a failure 
in 109 hours. MTBF gives the value of time between any two consecutive errors and is normally 
expressed in years. One year MTBF is equal to approximately 114,077 FIT.  
Most models for estimating the single event error rate due to high energy neuron particles (>1MeV) are 
based on the BGR model of [69], in which SER has the form:  
  
( ) ( )C C SSER Q BGR Q NV C=     (2.1) 
where BGR is the burst generation rate (cm2/µm3), as a function of the critical charge, QC (fC), N is the 
neutron flux (particles/cm2/hr), VS the sensitive volume (sensitive area × depth, d) in µm3 and C is the 
collection efficiency (0 < C < 1). Examples include the estimations of SER in SRAM by Hazucha and 
Svensson [70] and the modified BGR model of [71].  
2.4 FPGA 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a type of chip that can be programmed by the designer or user 
after manufacture. It is a semiconductor device containing programmable logic components called “logic 
blocks” as well as programmable logic interconnects and input-output blocks. Logic blocks and 
interconnects can be programmed to implement any available logical function, hence the term “field 
programmable”. The general structure of an FPGA (Figure 2.5) comprises a regular array of 
programmable logic blocks, programmable interconnect structure and programmable I/O blocks [72]. The 
Logic blocks are the functional units within the chip. They are connected via programmable interconnects 
with each other and via programmable I/O to the outside world.   
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The logic blocks almost always include user programmable memory elements in addition to their 
configuration memory. The memory may be made up of simple flip-flops or more complete blocks of 
static RAM or EEPROM etc. FPGA densities typically range from tens of thousands of equivalent gates 
to several millions and are typically designed using a hardware description language such as VHDL and 
Verilog. 
  
Figure 2.5: General Architecture of an FPGA (from [73]) 
Three common types of technology exist for FPGA: antifuse-based, SRAM based and flash based [74]. 
The leading vendors for FPGA in today’s market are Xilinx, Altera, and Actel.  Xilinx and Altera focus 
mainly on SRAM-based devices. Actel has offered a range of antifuse-based arrays and recently (as 
Microsemi) introduced a flash based FPGA range, although full details are not yet available in the public 
domain. 
An antifuse (Figure 2.6) works in a manner opposite to that of a conventional fuse. The antifuse starts 
with a high resistance and is designed to allow an electrically conductive path to be permanently created. 
A metal-to-metal programmable interconnect element positioned between the upper two layers of metal 
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antifuse requires multiple high voltage pulses and therefore they cannot be programmed (or un-
programmed) by high-energy particle impact. However, because they are neither reprogrammable nor 
reconfigurable they are inflexible once configured. 
                   
Figure 2.6: Antifuse Organization (from[75]) 
.  
Figure 2.7: Conventional Flash memory cell (from[75]) 
The SRAM and SEU effect was covered in Section 2.3.2. A flash memory cell, shown in Figure 2.7 
contains a memory cell that works as a controlled switch. Programming/erasing a flash switch requires 
voltages and energy far in excess of that which can be generated by cosmic-ray-induced particles. Flash-
based FPGAs were not common until Actel introduced their ProASIC3 series [76]. However the 
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 Xilinx and Altera use array based structures for their FPGAs, meaning that each chip comprises a two 
dimensional array of logic blocks that can be interconnected via horizontal and vertical routing channels 
[72]. Xilinx calls their logic block a Configuration Logic Block (CLB) and Altera uses the term Logic 
Element (LE). The Logic Blocks comprise Look Up Tables (LUT)s and one or more Flip-Flops (FFs). 
Figure 2.8 shows a general structure of a conventional FPGA, in this case an “island” style, so called 
because the logic blocks are positioned within a “sea” of interconnection channels. 
 
Figure 2.8: Generic FPGA structure (from [77]) 
FPGA devices contain a large amount of memory within a relatively small circuit area. Devices 
containing dense array of memory cells are especially vulnerable to SETs and SEUs. Most modern 
FPGAs contain tens of millions of bits for device configuration, internal block memory, user flip flops 
and so on. The user-defined circuitry is implemented using the configuration memory. The operation of 
the configuration memory blocks, routing resources, input/output (I/O) blocks and other programmable 
FPGA resources are defined by the configuration memory cells. The configuration memory cell is 
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susceptible to SEUs like all other memory cells. Any upset in the configuration memory can be 
catastrophic as it may change the operation of the look up tables, routing, I/O, and other resources, 
thereby potentially changing the device functionality.  
Amongst the commercial vendors only Actel has an intrinsically radiation resistant FPGA technology 
while Xilinx has produced radiation tolerant FPGA devices. A fault tolerant device is expected to tolerate 
occasional faults. A radiation hard device is expected to be indifferent to radiation effects. Radiation 
tolerant Actel FPGA series are RTAX, RT proASIC3 and RTSX-SU [74]. The RTAX series are antifuse-
based and have a LETth of 117 Mev-cm2/mg and SEU immunity to LETth >37Mev-cm2/mg. The Virtex-
5QV is the latest radiation hardened product from Xilinx. 
2.5 Mitigation techniques: Hardening FPGA-based systems against SEUs  
There are two basic techniques available to harden a circuit against SEU: minimising the amount of 
charge that can be collected by a node at a single event and/or increasing the critical charge necessary to 
produce an error. Techniques used to harden an overall design against soft errors are known as mitigation 
techniques. The individual techniques described in the literature are discussed in this section. 
2.5.1 Scrubbing 
Scrubbing is a technique that involves checking the memory, detecting the error and rewriting the correct 
data in the right memory location. This is a process that has been used for many years to increase the 
reliability of memory within radiation environments [78]. Error detection methods used and mention in 
the literature normally requires an extra set of hardware [79, 80]. Scrubbing is mostly applied to the RAM 
based structures, especially SRAM. The three scrubbing techniques in common use are: 
1) read-back with correction upon error detection; 
2) ICAP and FRAME_ECC cores; 
Chapter 2 Radiation, Soft errors and Mitigation Techniques 
26 
 
3)   Blind Writes or (Blind Scrubbing) [81]. 
A “Readback” scrubber detects configuration SEUs when comparing configuration data from the FPGA 
with the corresponding golden configuration data. The scrubber will correct the configuration SEU by 
writing the corresponding golden data when an error has been detected [82]. Using readback to correct 
SEU requires extra hardware and additional memory space. The read-back and comparison processes can 
triple the necessary amount of system memory making it untenable for many highly constrained space 
applications. 
An internal configuration access port (ICAP) provides access to the configuration memory from within 
the FPGA core and is available only in Xilinx VIRTEX-4 and VIRTEX-5 FPGAS. This technique is also 
known as internal scrubbing [83]. The Frame ECC function is performed each time a frame is read via the 
ICAP and the location and type of the error can be detected. A single bit error is corrected (i.e. inverted) 
in the frame data stored in the block RAM. The repaired frame is then written back into the configuration 
memory at the same frame address from which it was read. Readback resumes with the first frame of 
configuration memory in the configuration column containing the newly repaired frame. When a 
configuration column has been completely read and repaired, the SEU controller advances to the next 
configuration column in the array. One limitation with this technique is its inability to repair Multiple Bit 
Upsets (MBUs).  As a result MBUs accumulate, creating potentially serious interconnect errors. Further, 
the internal scrubber circuitry may cause improper function or may be stopped completely if it is hit [84]. 
This method has been used in conjunction with Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) which is also unable 
to detect MBUs [85].  
Blind Scrubbing is the simplest method to implement. In this case, valid configuration frame data is 
continuously written at a chosen interval over existing data into the device without checking whether 
there is an upset or not [82]. Thus any error resulting from a SEU will be over-written with a copy of the 
Chapter 2 Radiation, Soft errors and Mitigation Techniques 
27 
 
original data. However, the limitation with blind scrubbing is the need for the configuration logic to be 
continuously in “write mode”. The chosen scrubbing frequency must be based on the expected static upset 
rate which may vary widely at different times and in different operating environments. The technique 
obviously requires additional hardware components, including an external configuration memory to hold 
the original copy of the bit stream and an additional interface controller. These external hardware 
components must be protected from SEUs, using either mitigation techniques or via radiation hard design 
techniques [85]. 
The limitations of blind scrubbing, i.e., the need to continuously operate the configuration interface can 
be avoided by using partial reconfiguration (PR) [86]. This self scrubbing technique allows a portion of 
the design to be reconfigured while the remaining FPGA can be performing its normal function [82]. 
Partial reconfiguration can also serve to reduce FPGA circuit resources as instantiated components can be 
swapped in and out of the design. Thus, the same mechanism can be used to scrub configuration errors 
and to modify or upgrade the design at run time [87]. One limitation of this method is that PR is not 
possible while scrubbing is taking place as both cannot access the configuration memory simultaneously. 
2.5.2 Duplication with comparison 
 
Duplication with Comparison (DWC) is an alternate error detection technique that involves detecting 
errors in a circuit caused by an SEU rather than detecting the SEU. DWC does not use an external circuit, 
but is implemented within the user circuit. That circuit is duplicated and the outputs of both are compared 
to detect if an error has occurred. A comparator circuit detects any difference in the operation of two 
circuits and activates a SEU correction process [88].  
Although not used frequently, DWC is relatively easy to apply. It can also be used to detect transient 
errors and upsets within the flip flops. DWC can detect errors immediately and requires less extra 
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hardware. However, its major drawback (and probably the main reason it is not used more frequently) is 
that 50% of the FPGA resources needs to be reserved for the duplicate copy.  
2.5.3 Triple Modular Redundancy 
The Triple Modular redundancy (TMR) concept was first proposed in 1956 by John Von Neumann [89] 
and is often used in SRAM-based FPGAs to mitigate SEUs. TMR involves a technique where the circuit 
is triplicated and a voter circuit is used to choose the correct result (Figure 2.9) [90]. The circuit has three 
redundant copies of the original circuit and the majority voter passes the final output. Each copy of the 
circuit is referred to as a domain. A single fault in any domain will not produce an error at the output as 
the voter circuit will select the correct result from two other domains.  
 
Figure 2.9: TMR Fault Masking (adapted from [91]) 
Although TMR is very easy to implement, it has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it has to be augmented 
with some form of scrubbing. TMR will provide a faulty result on the event if two of the three domain are 
faulty i.e., had experienced a burst of SEUs and without scrubbing the SEUs will accumulate, eventually 
creating errors in multiple domains and breaking the protection offered by redundancy. Secondly, circuits 
with feedback will require voters to be inserted somewhere within the feedback loop as well in positions 
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radiation hard technology or some other mitigation technique, it is also prone to SEUs. Finally, TMR 
involves triplicating the hardware along with an addition of external voter circuit. 
Despite the relatively easy implementation of full TMR, voting after each LUT within a design can 
require up to six times the area of the original circuit [92]. In the case where full TMR is not needed, 
partial mitigation is an attractive alternative to reduce the extra hardware required. While partial 
mitigation can increase the reliability of a design at a lower cost, it is not as reliable as full TMR. A 
partial mitigation should therefore be applied to the parts of a system that will increase the reliability the 
most. This reduces its area cost with a minimum loss in reliability. 
Several methods have been proposed to achieve the most efficient circuit structure. Selective Triple 
Modular Redundancy (STMR) was proposed in [93], which uses signal probabilities to find the SEU 
sensitive sub-circuits of a design. A modified version of this method, which operates on LUTs rather than 
logic gates, was proposed in [94].  
The Partial TMR concept proposed in [95] uses the idea of persistence as a first level of prioritization 
[96]. A persistent error occurs when SEU irreversibly corrupts the internal state of the circuit. While non-
persistent errors can be corrected simply by repairing the FPGA configuration after an SEU (i.e., 
scrubbing), persistent errors stay even after the configuration is repaired. Partial TMR involves 
prioritizing the circuit components susceptible to persistent errors and applies TMR to them first. A 
software tool implements this technique automatically [95] by applying TMR constrained by this 
prioritization scheme until either a desired reliability level or a maximum resource count is reached. 
2.5.4 Temporal Redundancy 
Temporal redundancy uses redundancy in time, where a computation is repeated on the same hardware at 
three different times [97] [98]. The simplest form of this method involves repeating the exact same 
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computation on the same hardware module three times. However, this method is only capable of 
correcting transient errors. Any permanent fault in a module would produce incorrect results at all three 
computations, with exception of when the fault first manifests itself, in which case one, two, or all three 
results would be incorrect.  
2.6 Radiation hardness by circuit design 
 
Circuit design techniques such as adding path resistance and node capacitance have also been used to 
increase radiation tolerance. For example, a resistively hardened CMOS SRAM cell is shown in  
Figure 2.10 [65]. This might not have an overall effect on performance at room temperature, but the write 
response is slowed because the polysilicon resistance has a negative temperature coefficient. Also the 
difficulty of controlling the resistance values within the fabrication process makes the polysilicon resistor 
hardening approach unattractive for many circuit application.  
 
Figure 2.10: Resistively hardened CMOS SRAM cell schematic (from [65]) 
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2.7 Radiation hard technologies  
 
The term radiation hardening describes a range of techniques for designing and testing electronic 
circuitry to make them resistant to damage or malfunctions caused by high energy subatomic particles and 
electromagnetic radiation. Radiation Hardened (“rad-hard”) integrated circuits (RHIC)s are Integrated 
circuits that have been modified to resist radiation effects.  
The general effects of radiation on CMOS bulk technology have already been discussed in section 2.3. 
CMOS epitaxial technology has also been used for radiation hardened technology [65]. Epi-CMOS is 
fabricated by an abrupt change in the dopant concentration in the single crystal silicon concentration.  
When epi CMOS technologies are used for RHICs, active devices are fabricated in the thin surface layer 
of silicon overlying a more heavily doped silicon substrate which is also used as a supply voltage node. 
The reaction of epi CMOS to radiation is almost the same as bulk in terms of SEU and TID. 
 
CMOS technology can be hardened against radiation by fabricating its doped single-crystal silicon 
substrate over an insulating layer [65]. Such device technologies are known as Silicon on Insulator (SOI) 
technology, which refers to the layer of insulating material, usually silicon dioxide or silicon oxi-nitride 
separating the underlying silicon substrate from the active device area. When the insulator used is 
sapphire, the fabrication technology is called Silicon on Sapphire (SOS). Figure 2.11 illustrates the 
difference between bulk and SOS technology using the Peregrine UltraCMOS® SOS process as an 
example [10].  
Silicon on Sapphire is a hetero-epitaxial process for Integrated Circuit manufacturing that consists of a 
thin layer (typically thinner than 0.6 µm) of silicon grown on a sapphire (Al2O3) wafer. A film of single 
crystalline silicon film is grown over the substrate, then etched into islands and is doped to make a bipolar 
or FET transistor [65]. As the inter-device silicon is etched away in this technology, and sapphire is the 
substrate, complete electrical isolation is created between active devices, and between the devices and the 
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substrate. Therefore, the guard rings that are normally used to limit leakage current between transistors 
are unnecessary in SOS, and active devices can be packaged closer together. Also, there are no parasitic 
transistors to latch up, and the interconnection capacitances are greatly reduced. The key advantage of 
sapphire for this work is that it is an excellent electrical insulator so will prevent stray currents caused by 
radiation from spreading to nearby circuit elements. The sapphire protects the device against transient, 
neutron, and single event effects. Radiation-induced leakage currents cannot flow between devices 
because of the insulating substrate. 
 
Figure 2.11: Bulk CMOS and Ultra CMOS (SOS) Process (adapted from [99]) 
In addition, SOI supports a number of circuit techniques that are simply not possible in bulk CMOS. One 
such technique, an unconventional EEPROM cell [14] has been developed for use in a commercial 
Silicon-on-Sapphire (SOS) process mentioned above. Put simply, the cell comprises a pair of cross-
coupled nMOS and pMOS transistor sharing a common floating gate. The floating gate can be charged 
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positive or negative with respect to ground via the injection of either holes or electrons through the gate 
oxide. Unlike more traditional floating gate EEPROM cells, the SOS cell requires no special process 
layers and is therefore relatively easy to fabricate. 
 
Figure 2.12: Floor plan and the cross section of EEPROM cell (from[14]) 
 
Figure 2.13: Charging of the EEPROM floating gate (from[14]) 
The basic organization of the silicon-on sapphire EEPROM cell is shown Figure 2.12. The cell comprises 
two crossed intrinsic P and N transistors which share a common channel that forms a small “island” of 
intrinsic (un-doped) silicon. Because of its unique shape it is also sometimes referred as a PlusCell®. As 
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connection via both transistor types are available, charge of either polarity can be injected from the 
channel through the gate oxide and onto the floating gate and, since both the substrate and body are 
floating, a cell can be both written and erased with positive voltages. The gate is charged (negatively) 
using avalanche injection of hot electrons from the P-channel device, whereas injecting holes via the N-
channel erases the cell.  
The cell functionality is illustrated in Figure 2.13. As a result, there can be no over-erasure problem and it 
impossible for any decay in the cell charge resulting either from conventional oxide leakage or from a 
charged particle strike to completely flip the logic value. This also represents a key difference between 
the operation of these SOS cells and conventional EEPROM or Flash. Rather than just the presence or 
absence of charge on the gate indicating the programmed logic value, in the case of the SOS cell both 
logic levels are established by specifically charging the floating gate to an appropriate level. 
2.8 SEU Modelling 
The photocurrent resulting from a high energy ion strike is characterized by two collection phases: a 
phase of E-field accelerated free carrier motion (fast drift current), followed by a second phase of charge 
collection due to free carrier density gradients (slow diffusion current). A number of current models have 
been proposed by researchers and they are used by the circuit community to characterize Qcrit by 
performing SPICE simulations. One of the simplest was proposed in [100], using 3D device simulations 
in 0.35µm technology in which they defined Qcrit as:  
  Qcrit = CN .VDD + IDP.TF     (2.2) 
where CN is the node capacitance, VDD is the supply voltage, IDP is the maximum drain conduction current 
of the PMOS (provided the strike is made at the OFF NMOS drain) and TF is the flipping time of the cell. 
Determining TF involves 3D device simulation where the transient voltage of the opposite node, 
considered not struck by the incident ion, in the SRAM cell is observed during the flipping of the cell. For 
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finding Qcrit by SPICE simulations, it was proposed that the IDP.TF term in (2.2) can be ignored and Qcrit 
can be found by integrating an exponentially decaying current (I0.exp(-τ)) with small time constants less 
than 20ps. The magnitude of the current (I0) and the time constant of the exponential (τ) are achieved 
when the product I0.τ is minimized. The resulting Qcrit is therefore slightly under-estimated because of 
neglecting the additive term. 
  
Figure 2.14: Model pulse simulations for induced current (Adapted from [101]) 
Although originally set up to find Qcrit in bipolar memories, the model proposed by Freeman [99] has also 
been used for SRAM cell in [70, 102] and defines current in terms of total charge deposited (Q) by the ion 
and a single timing parameter τ as: 
 I(t) = (2/√pi).(Q/τ).(√(t/τ)).exp(-t/τ)     (2.3) 
Another diffusion collection model used in [102, 103] and described by (2.4) is considered more suitable 
for modeling neutron strikes. The time tMAX represents the instant when the maximum value of the current 
IMAX is reached. 
 I(t) = IMAX [e.(tMAX/t)]3/2 [exp(-3tMAX/2t)].   (2.4) 
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The most commonly used and most accepted model by the circuit community is given by (2.5). It is a 
double exponential pulse with two timing parameters τr and τf, representing the rising and falling time 
constants of the exponentials. This model has been widely used in the literature to find not only the Qcrit 























     (2.5) 
 
The current pulse rise and fall times (tr and tf), and their full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) strongly 
effect the characterization of Qcrit, to the point where each pulse model results in its own Qcrit value. Hence 
the characteristic timing parameters of the above models for one technology node cannot be extrapolated 
directly to the next technology node. Some empirical approximations have been used in the literature to 
select values for these parameters. The double exponential model was used in this work.  
2.9 Summary 
It is becoming clear that radiation is now an unavoidable concern within many normal environments for 
modern electronics. High energy charged particles induce ionization tracks of electron-hole pairs within 
CMOS devices that may change the switching characteristics of the device. Single event induced soft 
errors may not leave permanent physical damage but can result in a catastrophic situation for a circuit 
configuration or logic by changing stored data.  
FPGAs have proven to be very attractive choice in recent years, particularly for the flexibility they can 
offer to designers. Being a reconfigurable chip, a gate array allows the reuse and test of different designs. 
On the other hand its re-configurability makes it more vulnerable to single event upsets that induce soft 
errors. Any error in the configuration memory may change contents of the various array components such 
as the Look Up Table, the Input Output Block configuration as well as the routing connections and may 
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result in a totally different circuit that it was originally designed for or may simply cause incorrect results 
to be generated for the correct design. 
Much work had already been undertaken to increase the radiation tolerance of FPGAs. Mitigation 
techniques such as Triple Modular Redundancy and scrubbing have been in practice for quite some time 
now. Although they may increase the overall redundancy of the circuit, all these methods require 
additional hardware, memory and algorithm to detect and trigger an error, thus leading to an increase in 
complexity and power consumption. In many cases, the area and power costs are large compared to the 
small improvements achieved. 
Silicon on Insulator (SOI) (of which Silicon on Sapphire is a sub-class) is a device technology that offers 
intrinsically higher resistance to radiation. Due to its unique fabrication process, it also supports a number 
of circuit techniques that are not simply possible in bulk CMOS. This thesis presents and analyses a 
configuration memory system based on the SOS EEPROM structure proposed in [14] that will be 
intrinsically radiation hard and will not require additional mitigation techniques to maintain its correct 
operation. Chapter 3 describe the organization and functionality of this system in detail. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the static current for the Silicon on Sapphire based EEPROM (Electrically Erasable 
Programmable Read Only Memory) that forms the basis of this work is analysed. As their source and 
drain junctions cannot be forward biased to the substrate, SOI structures can be used in novel ways that 
would be impossible in bulk CMOS. The EEPROM cell used in this work is one such structure. The 
novelty of the proposed configuration cell lies in the fact that, rather than a conventional inverter which is 
typically added to an EEPROM to work as a built in sense amplifier, a Schmitt trigger is used with ~ 
±VDD/2 to provide immunity to configuration errors. In addition to increasing the critical charge of the 
structure, the Schmitt also provide an opportunity for the cell to be auto-scrubbing.  
A design is proposed that allows individual configuration memory cells to be monitored and scrubbed 
when a particle event is detected. A simple detector circuit can be used to compare the Schmitt supply 
current to detect any particle strike in memory cell. The configuration cell is immune to any single event 
particle strike on either the memory cell or the Schmitt. However, it is still possible for an error to occur 
when both the EEPROM and the Schmitt are hit during the same write cycle. Some preliminary 
probability estimates are calculated using established models of such an event leading to an upset.  
To demonstrate the operation of the memory cells in a realistic system, a Look Up Table (LUT) was built 
in a 250 nm SOS process. The structure of the LUT is conventional except that the ±Vcell from the 
EEPROM and the Schmitt had to be maintained right through the block, thus demanding a transmission 
gate (t-gate) approach. Finally we calculated the critical charge for each stage of the proposed circuit and 
estimated an SER (Soft Error Rate) value respectively.  
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3.2 Silicon on Sapphire EEPROM 
The configuration cell proposed here is the basis of this thesis. A configuration memory system is 
proposed and analysed that is based on the SOS EEPROM cell in [14]. Each EEPROM cell has a built in 
Schmitt sense attached that offers two useful characteristics. Firstly, the hysteresis of the Schmitt increases 
its Qcrit reducing the likelihood of a particle strike resulting in a transient error. Secondly, an strike on the 
EEPROM that causes its value to decay to zero will increase the static current of the Schmitt by up to five 
order of magnitude which is very easily detectable using conventional methods.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Basic Silicon On Sapphire EEPROM cell (PlusCell®) 
 
The organisation and functionality of the Silicon on Sapphire EEPROM cell (Figure 3.1) [14] was 
covered in Chapter 2. In this thesis, a variant of the basic SOS EEPROM cell was laid out using Cadence 
Virtuoso. The cell comprises two crossed intrinsic P and N transistors sharing a common channel. The 
structure contains both P and N transistors that allow the injection of charge of either polarity from the 
channel through the gate oxide and onto the floating gate using positive programming voltages. The gate 
is charges (negatively) by biasing across P-channel using avalanche injection of hot electrons though the 
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P channel and thus the cell is written. On the other hand if holes are injected via N channel it will erase 
the cell. This phenomenon allows it to be resistant to over erasure problem and it is impossible for any 
kind of decay in the cell charge resulting from either conventional oxide leakage or from a charged 
particle to completely flip the logic value. Figure 3.2 illustrates this point. This property also represents 
the key difference between the SOS EEPROM cell and other conventional EEPROM cell or flash. In 
conventional EEPROM or Flash the presence or absence of charge on the gate indicates the programmed 
logic value in the memory cell. In case of this SOS EEPROM cell, the programmed logic value is 
established by specifically charging the floating gate to an appropriate level of either polarity.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: EEPROM charge storage characteristics 
In a typical configuration, the floating EEPROM gate is integrated with a simple inverter structure to 
form a built in sense amplifier. This basic idea is extended in this thesis by replacing the inverter and 
adding a Schmitt sense amplifier, which will increase its immunity to soft errors.   
Figure 3.3 shows a conventional Schmitt circuit [105]. The Schmitt trigger has an inverter-like voltage 
transfer characteristics, but with two different logic threshold voltages for increasing and decreasing input 
signals, allowing it to be utilized for the detection of switching events in noisy environments. 




Figure 3.3: Schematic of a conventional Schmitt circuit 
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3.3 SOS EEPROM based Configuration cell 
The configuration cell (Figure 3.4) incorporates a Silicon-on-Sapphire EEPROM cell with the Schmitt 
sense amplifier thresholds set at ~±VDD/2. As mentioned above the Schmitt sense amplifier offer two 
main advantages. Firstly, each cell has a built in sense amplifier so that, while a particle strike on the 
interface my result in a transient upset, there is no direct mechanism by which the logic value of the 
configuration memory cell can be permanently flipped. On an event that is sufficient to bring the charge 
(and therefore the voltage) of the EEPROM cell down to zero, the hysteresis of the Schmitt will ensure 
the correct  output logic value is still maintained correctly. Figure 3.5 illustrates this point. It can be seen 
that the switching will only occur when the floating gate voltages reaches V+ or V– (depending on the 
direction of charge/discharge), something that cannot actually occur in the memory cell. 
 
Figure 3.5: DC characteristics of the configuration cell 
Figure 3.6 shows the static current versus cell voltage for the Schmitt circuit of Figure 3.4.  As the cells 
are being deployed as static configuration memories, their dynamic performance is largely irrelevant. 
Thus high threshold transistors (VTH ≈ ± 0.7V) were used throughout that resulted in very small static 
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current values in normal operation, in the pA range when |VCELL| > 0.7V. Table 3.1 shows the values for 
the voltage and their corresponding static current for the sense amplifier. 
 
Figure 3.6: Sense amplifier static current 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows that the static current increases by a factor of around 3×106   from <10 pA to more than 
28 µA at VCELL = 0. This behavior offers an opportunity to detect the occurrence of an upset event in the 
memory cell. Any partial charge/discharge due to a particle strike will be reflected in a significant 
increase in the static current drain of the sense amplifier. For example, even at a partially discharged cell 
voltage of 0.5V, the static current has increased by well over 103×, which can be easily detected using 
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Table 3.1 Sense Amplifier static current values 
















4.3 × 104 
2 × 106 
3 × 106 – 15 × 106 
1.5 × 105 




Figure 3.7 shows the trial layout for the memory cell performed in Cadence Virtuoso Version 5 using 
models for the commercial SOS process supplied by the foundry. Here, the SOS EEPROM layout has 
been folded in a way to match the height of the sense amplifier. The area overhead of the Schmitt sense 
amplifier results in an overall memory circuit that is larger than a conventional EEPROM. The Schmitt 
itself is similar in size of conventional six transistor SRAM in the same technology, but the entire 
memory cell is similar in size to radiation tolerant SRAMs of the sort described in [106, 107]. The overall 
design will be much more cost effective in terms of area and power when compared to conventional 
mitigation techniques such as TMR or scrubbing. In addition, the system proposed here has an advantage 
of non-volatility. Figure 3.7 also shows how the lack of a well and well/substrate contacts SOS can result 
in very compact circuit layouts.  





Figure 3.7: Schematic and layout of EEPROM cell with Schmitt sense amplifier 
 
The area of the Schmitt is similar a standard 6T SRAM, while the PlusCell EEPROM occupies 
approximately the area of two additional transistors. Modern radiation tolerant SRAM circuits now 
comprise as many as 11 Transistors [108, 109] and exhibit a critical charge of around 6.8 fC compared to 
~10 fC for the EEPROM in this work.  Thus, the EEPROM and Schmitt proposed here will be either 
slightly smaller than, or approximately equal to the area of a radiation tolerant SRAM circuit. 
 
3.4 Current Sensing 
As mentioned above, the scrubbing process is triggered by the large (>103×) increase in current that arises 
in the Schmitt when the SOS EEPROM cell suffers an upset event that moves its floating gate voltage 
towards zero.  A conventional cross coupled current sensor (Figure 3.8) has been used in this work. The 
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current sensor simply compares the supply current with a reference current that is set at design time by the 
number of blocks and their expected static current. The large difference between the currents to be sensed 
means that an error in either a single cell or a group of more than 105 blocks could still be readily 
detected, even allowing for a wide spread in individual static current values, as might be caused by 
manufacturing variability. 
 
Figure 3.8: Conventional cross-coupled current sense amplifier 
Figure 3.9 shows how detector is used in this work. A pair of configuration cells shares a single current 
detection circuit, which limits the area overhead of the scrubbing system. This type of conventional cross-
coupled inverter organization is common to SRAM or similar circuits. The current sensing operates in a 
simple sequence of steps that can be derived from a small state machine controller of the sort shown in  
Figure 3.10.  
VDD 
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Detect Sense amp 
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Figure 3.9: Current detection for Odd and Even memory banks 
 
 





















Figure 3.11: Simulated detection waveforms 
In the first state, the balance signal (BALANCE) drives the sense amplifier into its metastable region 
while a reference current for either the ODD or EVEN bank is enabled. The corresponding Error Detect 
line is also pre-charged. In the next state, the balance signal is deactivated and the sense amplifier allowed 
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to relax to one of its stable states, depending on the relationship between the reference and memory cell 
currents.  It will be described in section 3.6 how the high value of cell current (above the reference) 
caused either by a particle strike or by oxide leakage can be used to trigger the scrubbing process. In case 
of a particle strike in the odd or even bank the programming sequence is entered, otherwise the state 
machine simply moves on to check the next odd/even mode. As part of the programming sequence, the 
charge pump will be activated (VDD turned on) so that it ramps up to around 10V. Conventional 
programming techniques will then be used to program the EEPROM cells based on the value at the output 
of the Schmitt. These programming techniques are not considered further in this thesis. The simulation of 
a current detection event is shown in Figure 3.11. 
A circuit for the charge pump from [110] is simulated as shown in Figure 3.12. This charge pump circuit 
can achieve a programming voltage of 10V from a 1V supply. Keeping the charge pump powered down 
when it is not required as the additional benefit of increasing the radiation resistance of the programming 
system. 
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3.5 Look Up Table Circuit 
The Look Up Table (LUT) circuit in this proposal is conventional except that the ±VCELL from the 
EEPROM and the Schmitt circuits has to be maintained right through the block, thus transmission gates 
(t-gates) are used. Although this requires the generation and supply of an additional (negative) power 
supply, this is required for the Schmitt circuit in any case, so is considered to add little additional 
complexity other than is required by existing advanced devices that mandate multiple supplies, e.g., for 
core and I/O sections. Various T-gate LUT structures have been proposed previously. Their chief 
advantage is a lack of a voltage drop across the gate when on and their consequent ability to operate 
reliably at low voltage levels [111]. However, simple NMOS pass gates have tended to remain the 
preferred option as they offer the best compromise between performance and area in conventional CMOS 
[112].  
 
Figure 3.13: Simple Transmission gate layout in SOI 
As already discussed, a major advantage of SOI processes in general is their lack of deep well and body 
contract structures, which means that the overheads incurred in using a PMOS/NMOS transmission gate 
structure are not as high as in a conventional CMOS process where these have to allow for n or p-well 
separation rules. For example, in the simple SOI transmission gate layout shown in Figure 3.13, the 
separation between the P and N transistors is primarily determined by the active area (NLOCOS) overlap 
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and spacing rules, which in this particular process are approximately equal to the minimum transistor 
width. The overall result is a compact, high performance LUT structure with only a small increase in area 
compared to its corresponding NMOS pass gate structure in bulk CMOS. Figure 3.14 shows the 
Transmission gate based LUT Schematic. The next section will elaborate how this can be used to create a 
block that exhibits self-correcting, or auto-scrubbing behaviour. 
 
Figure 3.14: Transmission-gate LUT 
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3.6 Auto Scrubbing Behaviour 
In this section an organization is proposed that will allow individual configuration memory cells to be 
monitored and scrubbed when a SEU is detected. This behaviour is called auto-scrubbing. Although the 
SOI EEPROM and the Schmitt exhibit high intrinsic resistance to radiation induced errors (as will be 
detailed in section 3.7), it is still possible for a sequence of two particle strikes to permanently upset the 
configuration value. This is also true for other proposed self-correcting systems such as in [113], for 
example, and will result in the configuration value being irretrievably lost. The Soft Error Rate (SER) 

































Charge pump control 
 
Figure 3.15: Auto-scrubbing system configuration 
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The basic auto-scrubbing concept is illustrated in Figure 3.15. To write values into the memory the 
programming circuits are activated by enabling a high voltage charge pump. Keeping it disabled until 
required saves power and greatly reduces the likelihood that the charge pump itself will be degraded or 
damaged by repeated particle strikes. As described in section 3.3, an error is detected by  detecting 
changes to the EEPROM cell by comparing the supply current of its sense amplifier against a reference 
that is set somewhere between the normal operating supply current (<10nA) and that induced by an error. 
(>10µA). A reprogramming sequence is then initiated on the compromised cell using the value from the 
Schmitt as its reference.  
It was observed in Section 3.2 that the worse-case effect of a particle strike on the EEPROM cell will be a 
reduction in its stored charge, possibly to zero but never to the opposite charge. As long as the cell 
voltage (VCELL) is outside the band: CELLV V V− +≤ ≤ , then the Schmitt behaves as a purely combinatorial 
circuit. A strike on one of its internal nodes will only cause a transient error and the output will return to 
correct value following the event. Thus, under these circumstances, the output value of the Schmitt 
represents a stable reference that can be used to reinstate the EEPROM value, removing the need to store 
it externally. However, when VCELL is inside that range, the partial feedback that produces the hysteresis 
effect results in state behaviour and a radiation event can flip the sense amplifier to its opposite state, 
losing the configuration value. A sequence of two events is required. The first would “de-program” the 
EEPROM, reducing VCELL to within the critical band followed closely (i.e., within the re-configuration 
time) by a second event that flips the sense amplifier.  
3.5 Radiation hardness of the proposed system 
The proposed memory system was analysed to determine their tolerance to radiation. Both the critical 
charge for the SOS EEPROM and Schmitt combination and the Soft Error Rate (SER) for the memory 
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system have been calculated. In this section, some preliminary estimates are determined for the 
probability of a dual event sequence of this sort.  
3.5.1 SEU Analysis 
Previous research suggests that environmental mechanisms result in failure rates (i.e., Soft Error Rates, 
SER) in the order of 1~100 FIT (1FIT= 1 Failure/109 device hours) [114]. However, typical rates for a 
conventional SRAM have proved to be around 100–2000 FIT/Mbit at ground level [70, 115] and 106 
FIT/Mbit at flight altitude [115, 116]. As already mentioned, SOI technology is intrinsically more 
resistant to radiation events, at least in part due to its smaller collection depth resulting from the 
underlying insulating substrate. The silicon thickness (~110nm in the UltraCMOS® process) defines the 
lower limit of the collection volume.  
 
Figure 3.16 Simulated charge particle strike on Schmitt 
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In this work, the strike was modelled using a double exponential current pulse [101] of the form already 
described in (2.5). The PlusCell and the Schmitt were both simulated by applying this current pulse and 
determining the minimum value of Q that resulted in a cell disturbance. Figure 3.16 shows the critical 
charge characteristics for the Schmitt circuit. The circuit shown in Figure 3.4 was tested by injecting the 
model current pulse for particle strike. We can also see here how the use of Schmitt offers the further 
benefit of increasing the critical charge. Table 3.2 shows the comparison between the critical charge for a 
Schmitt circuit and a conventional inverter circuit. Details of how the circuits were simulated will be 
presented in Chapter 4. Figure 3.11 also shows the mono-stable behaviour of the Schmitt, as it returns to 
its previous value after the disturbance. In this particular example, the critical charge of the Schmitt is 
twice than that of the inverter (Table 3.2). Further, both are significantly larger than typical figures 
observed for bulk CMOS (e.g. in the 90 nm technology of [101]), due to the SOI technology and the 
larger feature size used in this work. 
Table 3.2 Critical charge comparison for Schmitt and Inverter 
Schmitt 140.8 fc 
Inverter 59.55 fc 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents approximate values of QC and VS for the EEPROM, Schmitt and LUT, along with 
values of BGR that were derived by slightly extrapolating the data in [71] for the given QC and 
approximate collection thickness.  The figures were then derived using (2.5), assuming a typical sea level 
neutron flux of 20/cm2/hr and a collection efficiency of 0.5. Note that the collection efficiency is simply 
an attempt to model the rate that charge is separated along the particle track. A figure between 0.1 and 0.5 
is representative of the range of values observed in the literature but will have little effect on the final 
SER estimates unless it falls well below 0.1.  
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Table 3.3 SER for EEPROM Schmitt and LUT Circuits 
Block QC VS BGR [71] SER  (FIT) 
MTBF 
(years) 
EEPROM 10 fC 1.045 µ3 4.6 × 10-14 cm2/µm3 4.8 × 10-14 2.4 × 1019 
Schmitt 140 fC 0.36 µ3 1.5 × 10-16 cm2/µm3 7.6 × 10-16 1.5 × 1021 
LUT Lvl 1 190 fC 1.26 µ3 6.0 × 10-15 cm2/µm3 1.4 × 10-13 8 × 1018 
LUT Lvl 2 98 fC 1.26 µ3 4.1 × 10-16 cm2/µm3 5.1 × 10-15 2.2 × 1020 
LUT Lvl 3 68 fC 1.26 µ3 9.1 × 10-16 cm2/µm3 7.8 × 10-15 1.5 × 1019 
 
Figure 3.17: Generalized MTBF time line for a single device error 
It can be seen that the large gate structure of the EEPROM results in a large collection volume. Even so, 
the SER FIT values for the various components range approximately from 4.8 × 10-14 for the EEPROM to 
7.6 × 10-16 for the Schmitt. Together, this is equivalent to a SER of close to 4 × 10-29, or 4 × 10-23 
FIT/Mbit, which contrasts with the typical rates outlined above for conventional SRAM of up to 106 FIT/ 
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The results for the LUT block vary fairly widely according to the position of the strike. The LUT values 
were simulated at three positions in the transmission gate tree, labelled Lvl 1 to 3, as shown in Figure 
3.14. Note that this is significantly better than the SER observed for conventional RAM and logic circuits. 
To gain an approximate understanding of the effect of simultaneous particle strikes on the combined 
EEPROM/Schmitt circuit, the generalised MTBF time line of Figure 3.17 can be used. In this work, a 
particle strike on the EEPROM represents the onset of the failure state for an individual cell. At this point 
there will be a period of time before the detection of the error that is determined by the clock period of the 
state machine controlling the current detection circuit. This is the mean Time to Detection (MTTD). Once 
the error condition is detected, there will be a further period of time to repair the error, the Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR), which will include the worse-case time to activate the charge pump circuit, followed by 
the cell programming time.  
In the standard model, the time MTTD+MTTR defines the availability of the system i.e., the proportion 
of the time it is functioning correctly, given by: 
MTBF
MTTRMTTDMTBF
tyAvailabili )( +−=     (3.1) 
In our case, the time MTTD+MTTR actually represents a scrubbing window within which the 
configuration memory is vulnerable to a second strike on the Schmitt. A permanent, non-correctable 
failure in the memory block will require two failure events in the correct order (EEPROM then Schmitt) 
and for the second event to occur within the scrubbing window. 
The most pessimistic value of SER therefore assumes that the two events on the EEPROM and Schmitt 
are exactly correlated (e.g., as a result of a dense burst of radiation) and using simple statistical analysis 
the SER of the entire cell will be the multiplication of the individual SER values for the two. This results 
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in a value in the order of 3.7 × 10-29, equivalent to a MTBF of 1034 years for a single device. For example, 
in a memory of 106 devices, the most pessimistic SER will be in the order of 1027 years. 
The scrubbing window can be used to further de-rate the probability of a dual strike in exactly the same 
way as time window masking [117] is used to de-rate the probability of a specific strike causing an error 
event in a synchronous circuit. Based on the data in this work and some preliminary simulations of the 
charge pump, this time is estimated to be in the range of several milliseconds, compared to a MTBF 
figure in the order of 107 years for the EEPROM alone. Thus, there is little point in calculating a specific 
re-rating factor for these circuits. We can consider the probability of a dual strike within the scrubbing to 
be vanishingly small and its upper bound is given by the most pessimistic SER derived above. 
3.6 Summary 
A configuration memory system based on a SOS EEPROM has been presented in this chapter. As this 
EEPROM is programmed plus or minus with respect to ground, it is impossible for a charged particle to 
flip the value of the memory cell completely. The Schmitt helps to maintain and pass the correct logic 
value to the next stage even if there has been a strike on the EEPROM. The static current behaviour of 
this Schmitt will easily allow the system to detect an error on the EEPROM by using a simple current 
comparator circuit. A small state machine can be used to trigger a rewrite or refresh for the memory. 
Although it is not possible for an error to occur if either the Schmitt or the plus cell suffers a strike during 
two different write cycles, it is still possible for an error to occur if both the plus cell and the Schmitt are 
hit in the same write cycle. For this particular event sequence an SER value was estimated and was found 
that the likelihood of a dual event of this sort is very small, such that the MTBF for the configuration cell 
will be in the order of 1034 years for a single device. Chapter Four will present the circuits, simulations 
and results supporting the work presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Simulation and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the schematics and simulations for the circuits developed in this thesis. All the 
components have been designed and simulated using models for commercially available 250nm SOS 
process (Peregrine Semiconductor PDK version 3.6) [15] and all simulations were performed using 
Cadence Virtuoso Version 5. The EEPROM was laid out in custom form as shown in Chapter 3. For the 
remainder of the circuit, the schematics were drawn in Cadence and the required simulations were 
performed to support the proposal. A trial layout was then drawn for the proposed structure. 
4.2 Circuits and Simulations 
The Cadence schematic for the Schmitt circuit is shown in Figure 4.1. The corresponding layout for the 
Plus Cell and the Schmitt was shown in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.7). Figure 4.2 shows the operation of the 
Schmitt in response to a changing input signal, illustrating the V+ and V- threshold values.  
 
Figure 4.1: Schmitt schematic 




Figure 4.2: simulation of Schmitt static current. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Particle strike current pulse simulation. 




Figure 4.3 shows how the current pulse was modelled for the simulations. An independent current source 
was chosen with exponential supply with its rise and fall times were specified as 16.1 ps and 161 ps 
respectively [101], and the maximum current adjusted to change the overall charge resulting from the 
simulated particle strike. Figure 4.4 shows an example of the parameter description to get a double 
exponential current pulse. 
.  
Figure 4.4: Particle strike current pulse description 




Figure 4.5: Inverter Schematic used to find the critical charge 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Simulation for Inverter critical charge 
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The critical charge for a conventional inverter and the Schmitt circuit were found and compared in this 
work. The inverter circuit that was simulated to find the critical charge is shown in Figure 4.5. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3 the critical charge was found to be 55.55fC for the inverter. Figure 4.6 shows the 
error that occurs just at the point where the critical charge is applied. The simulation was repeated several 
times using different current pulses to find the minimum charge at which the value at a circuit node flips. 
Figure 4.7 shows an example of the particle strike with insufficient effect on the node to permanently flip 
the value.  
 
Figure 4.7: Simulation with particle strike below Qeff 
The calculator function in Virtuoso was used to integrate the area under the current pulse to find the 
charge for that current pulse. An example is given in Figure 4.8 showing how the charge for a particular 
current pulse was determined. The limits are described as the initial and final value as shown in Figure 4.8 
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and the integral can be found which for this particular example is 10.76 fC. The schematic used to find 
the critical charge for the Schmitt circuit is shown in Figure 4.9. Figure 4.10 shows the simulation for the 
Schmitt critical charge, which was found to be 140.8 fC. 
 
Figure 4.8: Simulation of a current pulse and its corresponding charge 




Figure 4.9: Schematic for Schmitt with the current source to test the critical charge 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Simulation for Schmitt critical charge 








Figure 4.12: Layout of the detect Circuit 
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Figure 4.11 shows the schematic of the detect circuit used to compare the supply current of the Schmitt in 
order to identify a particle strike on the EEPROM cell. Figure 4.12 shows the layout of the corresponding 
circuit. Figure 4.13 shows the organisation of the detect circuit with two adjacent Schmitt cells. In this 
organisation, each detect circuit is used by two adjacent configuration cells, where the select lines (bitsel1 
and bitsel2 in the diagram) will determine which cell is being measured during a specific cycle. Figure 




Figure 4.13: Schematic for the organisation of the detect and the Schmitt 
The simulation results of this circuit are shown in Figure 4.15.  Note that this is the same simulation as in 
Figure 3.11 that describes the functionality of the detect circuit.  The layout for the plus cell was given in 
Chapter 3 in Figure 3.1.  
 














Figure 4.15: Simulated detection waveforms 
 
 




Fig 4.16 shows the schematic of a 2to1 multiplexer based on transmission gates. The LUT, basically a 
16to1 multiplexer was built hierarchically from 2to1 mux cell.  
 
Figure 4.16: Schematic of a transmission based two-to-one Multiplexer 
 
The schematic of the Look Up Table is shown in Figure 4.17 which is the same as the LUT that was 
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The critical charge of the LUT was found at three points within the circuit topology as shown on the 
diagram. As already reported in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3, the critical charge is about 190 fC at level 1, 98 
fC at level 2 and 68 fC at level 3 (Figure 4.17).  Figure 4.19 shows the simulation for the critical charge at 
level 1. The Soft Error Rate (SER) values calculated using (2.5) were listed previously in Table 3.3, 
Chapter 3. The BGR values were estimated by using the table from [71] with consideration of the 
technology used in this work. 
 
Figure 4.19: Simulation for the critical charge at level 1 for the LUT 
Figure 4.20 shows the schematic of the charge pump and Figure 4.21 shows the simulation of the charge 
pump. The chanrge pump will pump 10 V from 1V. 




Figure 4.20: Circuit for the charge pump 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Simulation for the charge pump output 
 
Finally a trial layout was done for the organization of the LUT with the proposed configuration cell based 
on the EEPROM which is included in Appendix A. A part of the layout shown in Fig 4.19. 




Figure 4.22: Part of the LUT layout with memory block and detect 
4.3 Summary 
The circuits and simulation supporting the work presented in Chapter 3 have been shown in this chapter. 
The schematic for the Schmitt and the static current simulation shows the benefit for choosing Schmitt in 
this work. The techniques used to find the critical charge of the circuit and their respective Soft Error Rate 
(SER) have been covered. An independent current source was used as the current pulse created when a 
particle strikes the device and the parameters for the double exponential model was presented. The detailed 
simulation for the functionality of the detect circuit and how the system can be triggered to refresh the 
memory supporting the auto scrubbing idea was presented. Finally we can see how the reconfigurable 
memory system can work within the LUT. We look at the findings of this thesis and define the scope for 
future work in Chapter 5. 
Configuration cell Detect circuit Part of the LUT 
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Chapter 5 Summary, Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Summary 
Radiation induced single event effects are now considered to be the “Achilles’ heel” of modern electronic 
systems. Such unwanted soft errors have been of major concern since their effect on semiconductors was 
first revealed during the 1960s. Although non permanent (as the damage is not physical), the loss of 
memory information in a digital system may be catastrophic especially for reconfigurable systems such as 
FPGAs. Although FPGAs are becoming more and more popular due to their flexibility, they are also 
highly vulnerable to radiation as they typically contain large memory arrays within a small area. Previous 
researchers have developed many mitigation techniques to harden an overall design against radiation, 
including methods such as scrubbing and triple modular redundancy. However all of these methods 
require additional hardware and memory and therefore take extra area and power. Other methods to 
achieve higher radiation tolerance include adding capacitance to increase the critical charge for the 
circuit.  
Silicon on Insulator (SOI) is a class of device technology that offers higher resistance to radiation due to 
its unique characteristics. It is free of the parasitic bipolar transistors present in bulk CMOS, so is resistant 
to latch up effects. Its source/drain and interconnection parasitic capacitances and resistances are typically 
<10% that of bulk CMOS, so it offers the potential for high speed operation. Finally, the lack of deep well 
and guard regions results in denser layouts than the equivalent in bulk technology.  It also supports the 
creation of unique structure such as the EEPROM cell proposed in [14].  
This thesis has proposed and analysed a configuration memory system based on the SOS EEPROM 
structure proposed in [14] that will be intrinsically radiation hard and will not require additional 
mitigation techniques to maintain correct operation.  In this proposal, each SOS EEPROM has a built in 
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Schmitt sense amplifier that, apart from exhibiting a much higher critical charge value compared to a 
normal inverter, maintains the correct logic output regardless of disturbances on the EEPROM cell. While 
a particle strike may result in a change to the EEPROM charge and move the cell voltage towards zero, 
the logic value of the overall memory cell cannot be permanently flipped as it can never reach the 
switching threshold of the Schmitt. The worse-case effect will be a significant increase (potentially over 
five orders of magnitude) in the static current drawn by the Schmitt as its input bias changes. Such a large 
current change can be detected using simple current sense techniques, which can then be used to trigger a 
scrubbing sequence, thereby restoring the EEPROM cell charge and returning the static current to its pre-
upset value. Combining the EEPROM/Schmitt circuit with a simple current detector and state machine 
controller, it has been shown how the circuit can be set up to exhibit “auto scrubbing” behaviour, in which 
the value at the output of the Schmitt becomes the reference (“golden” ) value that is reloaded into the 
EEPROM. 
Although it is not possible for an error to become permanent (hard) if the Schmitt or the PlusCell®  
EEPROM is hit within two different write cycles, it is still possible for a hard error to occur if both are hit 
in the same write cycle. For this particular event an SER value was estimated and was found that its 
probability is very small. The overall structure offers a radiation hard reconfigurable organisation with 
automatic detection and with no need for additional external memory/hardware to manage the scrubbing 
process. 
5.2 Conclusion 
A key objective of the work described in this thesis has been to propose and analyse a method of building 
radiation hardened Field-programmable gate array components based on Silicon-On-Sapphire technology  
(a subclass of SOI technology where sapphire is used as the insulator). SOS technology has been applied 
here due to its inherent radiation tolerance and because of the unique layout opportunities it offers.  
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The non-volatile Silicon-on-Sapphire based EEPROM, which forms the basis of this work, can be 
manufactured using a standard single polysilicon process with no special layers. This organization is only 
possible because of the lack of a P-N junction from the transistor active region to the substrate. Further, as 
the cell operates by charging its single floating gate to positive or negative potentials, using hot-electron 
or hot-hole avalanche injection through the gate oxide, it is not possible for a radiation-induced event to 
permanently flip the EEPROM state as this would require the floating gate charge to be completely 
discharged to zero, then reversed. 
In a typical organization of this cell, which has already been applied commercially, the EEPROM is 
combined with an inverter that acts as a sense amplifier for the individual cell. In the configuration 
memory proposed here, the inverter is replaced with a Schmitt sense amplifier. The Schmitt not only 
enhances the radiation resistance of the overall cell but also works maintain the logic value of the cell in 
the face of any event that causes a partial de-programming of the EEPROM and therefore a reduction in 
the magnitude of its effective storage voltage. On such events the thresholds of the Schmitt act to 
maintain the correct logic value on to the output.  Any reduction in the magnitude of the effective storage 
cell voltage will cause a large increase in the static current of the cell, possibly as high as 107×, but more 
likely to be in the order of 105×. Such a large increase in current is easily detected using a conventional 
sense amplifier and this simple property can be used to set the cell set up to be self-correcting, exhibiting 
so-called “auto-scrubbing” behavior.   
In this thesis, scrubbing behavior was demonstrated using a current sensor shared between two adjacent 
configuration memory cells. This resulted in a compact layout where the current sense cell layout 
approximately matches the pitch of a pair of EEPROM/Schmitt cells.  However, the large change in 
current results in very flexible circuit options. As an upset on even one cell in 105 can still be detected, a 
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single current sense circuit could be shared across an entire small configuration array, or alternatively 
across a single row (column) of the array.  
Overall, the area of the configuration cell compares favorably to modern radiation tolerant SRAM circuits 
that comprise as many as 11 transistors. The proposed configuration EEPROM also exhibits a critical 
charge value about 40% higher—approximately 6.8fC vs. a typical value of around 10fC. Adding the 
Schmitt further improves the SEU tolerance of the proposed configuration cell so that the cell itself can 
act as the “golden” memory in its scrubbing system.  
While the memory is resistant to permanent changes from isolated particle strikes, it is still possible for a 
sequence of two events to permanently upset the configuration value. An error will occur only when two 
particles with charge above the critical charge will hit the EEPROM and the Schmitt simultaneously 
within the same write window. For such an error the Soft Error Rate for the proposed configuration cell is 
found to be 3.7 × 10-29, which means the Mean Time Between Failure for the configuration cell would be 
in the order of 3 × 1034 years. This can be compared with typical rates for a conventional SRAM circuit 
that have been shown to be in the order of 106 FIT/Mbit at flight altitude. 
5.3 Future Work 
The configuration memory presented and the LUT suggested in this work can be taken further towards the 
building of a complete FPGA.  Preliminary work has been undertaken towards a fully implemented auto-
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